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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961
accepted, but the fact of marriage should not mean wholesale destruc-
tion of individual liberty and rights. There is no compelling reason why
a wife should not be afforded the right to sue her husband for a mali-
cious and wilful tort. The day has come when Cardozo's traveler must
again arise and continue on his journey.
RIcHARD H. WnLir s
Landowner's Liability to Servants of Independent Contractor.
In Murk v. Aronsen the Washington Supreme Court had occasion to
consider a landowner's tort liability where work is placed under the
control of an independent contractor. In a 5-to-4 decision the court
held that an owner is not liable to a contractor's servant injured by the
negligence of a contractor who has control of the premises. By its deci-
sion the court has reaffirmed its earlier position,' despite a trend toward
expanding the exceptions to the rule of non-liability for torts of inde-
pendent contractors.3
The Congregation Bikur Cholim had employed the Aronsens as
caterers to prepare and serve a banquet at the synagogue. The Aron-
sens, during the course of the preparation, serving and clean-up were
given complete control of the kitchen and were not supervised by the
synagogue. The Aronsens also provided their own employees, one of
whom was the plaintiff, Ebba Murk.
While dinner was being prepared Louis Aronsen spilled cooking
grease on the floor. Although the slippery condition of the floor was
called to his attention nothing was done about it. Later in the evening
Murk walked past the stove, slipped on the grease and was injured. She
brought suit against both the Congregation and the Aronsens. A judg-
ment was directed against the Aronsens but the suit against the syna-
gogue was dismissed.
In affirming the dismissal of the suit against the synagogue, the
majority based its decision upon the factors of control and duty. It
recognized that the principal employer owes a duty to the servants of
his independent contractor not to injure them by his own negligence.4
However, when the servant is injured solely through the negligence of
157 Wn2d 785, 359 P2d 816 (1961).
2 Campbell v. Jones, 60 Wash. 265, 110 Pac. 1083 (1910).
3 Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 IiL. L. REv. 339, 345 (1934).
"It is believed that the apparently expanding exceptions to the traditional rule of insula-
tion indicate that the law is headed that direction."
4 Construction company held liable to the employees of an independent contractor for
injuries resulting from the company's negligence in providing a defective scaffold to be
used by the employees. Bowen v. Smyth, 68 Wash. 513, 123 Pac. 1016 (1912).
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the independent contractor in control of the premises, the principal
employer owes no continuing duty to inspect or give warning.*
The court, on the facts presented did not apply any of the exceptions
to the rule of non-liability for the owner. The kitchen and the job were
not inherently dangerous.' The injuries were not caused by any con-
cealed danger or trap.' Neither was there a showing that the premises
were not in a fit state of repair when control was relinquished to the
independent contractor. Thus, the majority opinion followed the posi-
tion reached by most courts faced with similar factual situations.'
The policy considerations in favor of holding the principal employer
liable, especially when the independent contractor has proved to be
financially irresponsible, have led to proposals that the employer be a
guarantor of the financial responsibility of his contractors.' This desire
for a wider scope of liability is reflected in the dissenting opinion of
Judge Foster.
His dissent is based, first, upon the proposition that there were suffi-
cient facts from which a jury could have determined that the synagogue
had not relinquished all of its rights of occupancy and control. Even
assuming Aronsen's negligence, the possibility of the synagogue's con-
curring negligence could not be ruled out.
The second basis of the dissent focusses upon the fact that Mrs.
Murk was an invitee on the premises and the synagogue owed her a duty
of reasonable care. It is true, as a general rule, that employees of inde-
pendent contractors are regarded as "invitees" of the owner. 0 A duty
is owed to invitees to exercise reasonable care in making and keeping
the premises safe, and the owner cannot relieve himself of that duty by
delegating it to an independent contractor. 1
5Duty extends only to conditions existing when the premises are turned over to the
contractor, and not to conditions arising out of changes caused by the progress of the
contractor's work. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Fuller, 212 Ala. 177,
102 So. 25 (1924).
6Person v. Canldwell-Wingate Co., 176 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1949).
7 Smith v. Southwest Missouri R. Co., 333 Mo. 314, 62 S.W.2d 761 (1933).8 Footnotes 12 and 13, infra.
9 Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339 (1934).
1o Prosser, Business Visitors and Insitees, 26 MINx. L. Rxv. 573, 605 (1942). Re -
ferring to Indemaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274, 35 L.J.C.P. 184, aff'd L.R. 2 C.P. 311,
36 L.J.C.P. 181 (1866), Dean Prosser states, "Since this decision independent con-
tractors and their servants doing work on the occupier's premises have been held with-
out dissent to be 'invitees,' whether in business establishments or in private homes."
Dobbie v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 95 Cal. App. 78, 273 Pac. 630 (1928) ; Carr v.
Wallace Laundry Co., 31 Idaho 266, 170 Pac. 107 (1918).
11 Corrigan v. Elsinger, 81 Minn. 42, 83 N.W. 492 (1900) ; Gilmore v. Philadelphia
& R.R., 154 Pa. St. 375, 25 Atl. 774 (1893). In these cases the premises were under at
least the partial control of the employer.
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The basic difficulty in reasoning from this general proposition to the
particular facts here is that most courts do not apply this rule when they
meet the specific situation where the owner has given up the right to
direct, inspect, and control the manner of doing the work. These courts
have either refused to regard the employees of this contractor as in-
vitees of the owner, 2 or have held that the usual duties incident to the
relationship are not involved. 3
It would seem that basically there is a misinterpretation by the dis-
sent of the majority's position. E.g., "The court declares that the em-
ployee of an independent contractor is not an invitee of the occupier of
the premises".' 4 What the majority did state was that Mrs. Murk was
not the kind of business invitee to whom an owner owes a non-delegable
duty, because of the owner's lack of control. 5 If the owner had been in
control then the invitee argument clearly would be applicable, and on
this both the majority and dissenting opinions agree."
The cases relied upon by the dissent in Murk all involve instances
where the principal employer has either retained control of the premises
during the time of the work or else has been negligent in leaving them
unsafe in the first place. 7
Prior Washington decisions may, at first glance, seem contradictory
to the majority's position. In Blancher v. Bank of California," a bank
contracted to have the mezzanine of the bank's lobby cleaned and re-
decorated. The plaintiff, a customer, was leaving the bank and fell over
a stepladder left on the floor by the contractor. The responsibility for
keeping the floor clear of obstruction was under the personal supervi-
sion of the contractor. The court affirmed a jury verdict against the
12 Butler v. Lewman, 115 Ga. 752, 42 S.E. 98, 100 (1902). In this case the owner of
the building turned it over to a sub-contractor to be reconstructed. The court stated,
"Accordingly, it cannot be fairly said that the plaintiff occupied the position of one who
was by implication, at least invited by the owners to enter.., for it is clear that, having
for the time being relinquished all control over it, they had no right, so long as the
contractors remained in lawful possession thereof, to extend to anyone an invitation to
go upon the premises ......
13 Aluminum Ore Co. v. George, 186 S.W.2d 656 (Ark. 1945).
14 Murk v. Aronsen, 57 Wn2d 785, 790, 359 P.2d 816, 819 (1961).
' Id. at 787, 359 P.2d 817.
10 For a recent extension of the "invitee" concept by the Washington Court see Ward
v. Thompson, 57 Wn.2d 655, 359 P.2d 143 (1961) noted in this issue at p.250 infra.
17 Dobbie v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 95 Cal. App. 781, 273 Pac. 630 (1928) ; Carr v.
Wallace Laundry Co., 31 Idaho 266, 170 Pac. 107 (1918) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Wallace, 172 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1949) ; Gagnon v. St. Maries Light & Power Co., 26
Idaho 87, 141 Pac. 88 (1914) ; It re Wimmer's Estate, 111 Utah 444, 182 P.2d 119
(1947). In Davis Bakery v. Dozier, 139 Va. 628, 124 S.E. 411 (1924), the employer
gave up control to the independent contractor, was not negligent in selecting him, and
was not liable to the contractor's employee.
18 47 Wn.2d 1, 286 P.2d 92 (1955).
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bank on the "invitee" theory and held that the bank could not be re-
lieved of its duty by its contract with the independent contractor.
In Bowen v. Smyth,"0 and in a federal decision, Katalla Co. v. John-
son,2" the courts held the principal employer liable for injuries to the
employees of independent contractors. In the Bowen and Katalla cases,
the occupier committed affirmative acts of negligence himself. In
Blancher, the bank carried on its banking business during the time the
renovation of the lobby was being effected. It was still in control of the
premises and while it retained some control it could not escape its duty.
Closer to the point is Campbell v. Jones." The plaintiff, a sub-con-
tractor's employee, brought an action against both the sub-contractor
and the railroad company. His injuries were received when the sub-
contractor's foreman kicked a stump loose above the working place,
causing a rock to roll down the hill and strike him. The court held that
as to the railroad company, the plaintiff was not an employee, as the
company had given up control over the details of the work to the sub-
contractor. The latter, on the other hand, did owe a duty to oversee the
work and to see that its performance did not result in injury to his
servants.
It would seem that the Campbell case provides a background into
which the decision in the principal case can be fitted. Given the con-
curring factors of the occupier's surrender of control and the independ-
ent contractor's supervening negligence, the Washington court has held
that the occupier should not be liable. The invitee argument has not
succeeded simply because the court has not accepted it where the occu-
pier no longer has control of the area in which the harm occurred, even
though he owns it and the employee is there for his benefit. The expan-
sion of the exceptions to the rule of non-liability of the occupier has not
yet progressed this far, and future findings of liability will probably
depend upon a showing by the plaintiff that the occupier has retained
some measure of control. DWAYNE CoPPLE
Liability of Charitable Institutions - Immunity. In Pierce v.
Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, with a clear and comprehensive
19 68 Wash. 513, 123 Pac. 1016 (1912).
20 202 Fed. 353 (9th Cir. 1913).
2160 Wash. 265, 110 Pac. 1083 (1910). See also Larson v. American Bridge Co.,
40 Wash. 224, 82 Pac. 294 (1905), reaching a similar result but based upon a lack of
privity between the original employer and those engaged in the work as employees of
the independent contractor.
143 Wn.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
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